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The Marshfield Clinic Case: The Sound of a
Broken Record
Kevin McDonald*

INTRODUCTION

Ah, Posner.
There was an episode of the television show M*A*S*H, you
may recall, in which company clerk Radar O'Reilly was intent
on impressing a certain nurse. The mischievous meatball surgeons thus began to coach him on ways to demonstrate superior
intellect and cultural refinement. In the area of classical music,
they told him what to say about several composers, but, if the
name of J. S. Bach arose for any reason, he was told to only lean
back, eyes half-closed, and sigh, "Ah, Bach."
Thus do I begin most discussions of the Marshfield Clinic case,
with a similar hommage to Chief Judge Richard A. Posner of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the author of the opinion in
the case of Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, Inc. v.
Marshfield Clinic.1 Prior to Judge Posner's opinion, the antitrust
dispute between Marshfield Clinic and Blue Cross had generated substantial interest and commentary in the health care
community and the antitrust bar principally (as two commentators put it) because of "the prominence of the featured players
and the dollar value of the jury verdicts."2 The original verdict
against the Clinic-$48 million after trebling-was reduced by
the trial judge to $17 million. Much of the drama ended when
the Seventh Circuit promptly reversed nearly every jury finding
and vacated the entire judgment.
*

Kevin McDonald is a partner of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. Working out of

its Washington, D.C. office, Mr. McDonald was one of the lawyers representing the
Marshfield Clinic at trial and on appeal. Mr. McDonald received his Bachelor of Arts
in Economics from Kenyon College, and his Juris Doctor from Case Western Reserve

University. Counsel for both parties were invited to provide their comments on and
lessons learned from the case. This article is based in part on a paper delivered to the
National Health Lawyers Association in February of 1996.
1. 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996).
2. Bradley G. Clary & Michael A. LaFond, Antitrust and Integrated Delivery Systems: Blue Cross... v. The Marshfield Clinic..., HEALTH L. DI., Feb. 1995, at 3, 9.
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THE COURT'S OPINION

Free At Last
From the perspective of those who defended the Clinic from
the blunderbuss charges leveled by Blue Cross, the appellate decision was deeply gratifying, albeit vastly overdue. Blue Cross
essentially alleged that Marshfield, a 400-member physicianowned clinic with twenty-one branches, had monopolized the
delivery of physician services in the largely rural portions of
northern and central Wisconsin that it serves. 3 Marshfield allegedly accomplished this goal in many ways, including by acquiring physician practices and opening new clinics in admittedly
underserved rural locations. Marshfield had also established its
own HMO, the co-defendant Security Health Plan. Security's
network included the 400 physicians employed by Marshfield
and some 900 other independent "affiliates."' 4 The agreements
with the affiliates were nonexclusive; in addition to their HMO
patients, the affiliates cared for fee-for-service patients covered
by indemnity insurers such as Blue Cross and participated in
other PPO and HMO networks. Marshfield's conduct allegedly
injured Blue Cross as an indemnity insurer because the Clinic
charged Blue Cross's insureds "monopoly" prices, some or all of
which Blue Cross was required to pay. Marshfield had also allegedly injured Blue Cross's largest HMO subsidiary, co-plaintiff Compcare, by excluding it from the market for HMO
services. This was accomplished by Marshfield's refusal to enter
into a contract (on terms that Blue Cross deemed "reasonable")
to make its employed physicians part of Compcare's HMO
network.5
The Seventh Circuit opinion in Marshfield confirms that successful plaintiffs must, at some point, prove their allegations.
There was simply no evidence, Judge Posner pointed out, that
Marshfield was a monopolist in any market, that Marshfield had
engaged in predatory conduct, that Marshfield somehow "controlled" the independent doctors in its service area, or that
Marshfield's allegedly "supracompetitive" prices-which were
comfortably in line with those of other large clinics but higher
than the prices of the "average" doctor in Wisconsin-reflected
anything but the quality of its world-class physicians and facili3.
4.
5.

65 F.3d at 1409.
Id.
Id. at 1408.
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ties.6 The court also confirmed that there was nothing suspect,
much less anticompetitive, about the Clinic's decision to enter
the health insurance business by establishing its own HMO, discrediting the plaintiffs' argument that the HMO's very structure
entailed price fixing. Nor could the Clinic's reputation for rendering services of exceptionally high quality convert it into an
"essential facility" required to deal with Blue Cross's HMO. 7
There was much more, though the opinion moves so quickly
that some of the issues are hard to spot by those not involved in
making the record. While most attention has focused on the
court's holding that no evidence supported the finding that
HMOs constitute a "market" separate from other health insurance plans, the court also rejected the jury's findings that Marshfield was guilty of monopolization in some or all of several
dozen other markets for primary care and various specialty care
services.
The "evidence" to support these latter conclusions was supplied by Blue Cross's economist and relied, we repeatedly argued, on three untenable assumptions.
(1) The geographic markets for primary care could consist of
thirty- to fifty-mile circles drawn around each of the Marshfield
Clinic satellite offices. Because some of these offices were quite
close to each other, this approach produced what Judge Posner
called "a dizzying series of concentric circles," some of which
overlapped entirely but which the economist insisted were separate geographic markets for the same primary care product.8
Thus, the same consumer in northern Wisconsin could simultaneously live in as many as six different geographic markets for
the same product. 9 There is no legal definition of a geographic
market that can produce this result.
(2) Specialty care product markets could be defined as each
separate "diagnostic related group" (DRG), as defined by
Medicare. DRGs, of course, group various services to predict
the length of hospital stays, not to define markets. Mind you,
the economist's definition did not combine groups of DRGs
(such as all those related to cardiac surgery or to oncology),
which could be a starting point for defining a physician services
6. Id. at 1412 ("Generally you must pay more for higher quality.").
7. The essential facilities principle obligates natural monopolists to provide access
to would-be competitors. Id. See also Clary & LaFond, supra note 2, at 7.
8. Id. at 1411.
9. See Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. 1247, 1271 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (Exhibit 984 appended to district court opinion).
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market. Instead, the expert insisted that each of the 494 individual DRGs was a separate specialty care product market, not substitutable for another in any sense. Having some fun with this
argument, Judge Posner noted that the concept of supply substitutability alone rendered absurd the conclusion that "circumcision of a male 17 years old or older" was a separate product
market from "circumcision of a male under 17. ' ' 10
(3) In calculating Marshfield's "monopoly" share of these
oddly defined markets, all of the services rendered by the independent physicians affiliated with Marshfield's HMO-even
to non-HMO patients-would be included as a sale of services
by Marshfield. Under this theory, when one of the independent
doctors in Marshfield Clinic's HMO network treated a nonHMO patient insured by Blue Cross's indemnity plan (a transaction from which Marshfield Clinic received not a dime), that sale
was added to Marshfield's market share because Marshfield allegedly "controlled" those doctors. Judge Posner made short
work of this argument as well, noting the undisputed evidence
that affiliates could (and did) work for other health plans, and
that they derived only a tiny portion of their income from the
Marshfield HMO."
Not Even Close
While the litigation between Marshfield and Blue Cross,
taken as a whole, continues to generate discussion on questions
of health care policy, antitrust law, and even litigation strategy,
Judge Posner's opinion is best understood as simply restoring
sanity; simply demanding that the most fundamental rules of antitrust law, such as market definition, be followed by the plaintiffs; and simply requiring proof of each essential element. For
if these are the tests applied to the trial record in Marshfield, it
is not a close case. If this sounds immodest, consider the posture of both sides on appeal. Conventional wisdom has it that
successful appellants of adverse jury verdicts must distill one or
two purely legal issues for the appellate court; arguments based
solely on the insufficiency of the evidence to support a civil jury
verdict are for losers. Before the Seventh Circuit, however, we
appealed on multiple essential elements of each claim. Our arguments were based not on improper evidentiary rulings or jury
instructions but solely on the sufficiency of the evidence. In
10.
11.

65 F.3d at 1411.
Id.
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other words, we accepted the highest burden an appellant can
have and plainly satisfied a respected Seventh Circuit panel.
If that does not persuade you, look at the amici curiae brief
filed by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on Blue Cross's motion
for reconsideration before the Seventh Circuit. The government
is, of course, an active antitrust plaintiff; in recent years, it has
opposed many HMO mergers and hounded the purveyors of
"most favored nation" clauses (MFNs), including Blue Cross itself. 12 The government thus had every incentive to argue that
the jury's findings should have been upheld, but it did not do so.
After taking a look at the record (at our prompting), the government expressly declined to support Blue Cross's argument
for affirmance:
The United States and the Federal Trade Commission take no
position on the sufficiency of the record to support the jury's
verdict. We are concerned, however, that the Court's explanations of its conclusions on two issues may mislead readers unfamiliar with the record and arguments in this case as to the law
applicable to market definition and [MFNs] ....
In the end, all the government could request was "clarification" that no HMO market was proven to exist in this case,
something the original Seventh Circuit opinion had stated in at
least three places. 4 As the DOJ's experience shows, if one
looks for evidence of meaningful antitrust facts in this record,
one comes up empty.
Consider, for example, the record on the HMO product market issue, and you will find the most basic evidence missing. The
claim that Blue Cross's HMO, Compcare, was "excluded" from
the HMO market by Marshfield's refusal to join its network accounted for about ninety percent of the damages awarded. This
claim depends entirely on the existence of a separate HMO
market, as both the trial and appellate courts noted. If one were
trying to prove such a market, what evidence would be adduced? One would probably start with some data showing that
consumers do not readily substitute HMOs for other plans when
12. See generally Anthony J. Dennis, PotentialAnticompetitive Effects of Most Favored Nation Contract Clauses in Managed Care and Health Insurance Contracts, 4

L. 71 (1995).
13. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 3, Marshfield, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Nos. 95-1965, 95-2140) (emphasis added).
14. 65 F.3d at 1409-10.
ANNALS HEALTH
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shopping for health care services. One would probably also
have an expert economist opine that, in light of such data and
other evidence, HMOs and other plans are not good substitutes
and thus do not compete in the same market. The plaintiffs here
did neither. The only data in the record on consumer substitution was offered by Marshfield and cuts the other way. Moreover, plaintiffs' economist not only failed to support the crucial
concept of an HMO market, but he testified that Compcare had
been excluded from "the health care financing market," which
15
he agreed included HMOs and all other forms of insurance.
This is not a promising start if one wishes to make this the test
case for establishing the first separate HMO market accepted by
any court. As shown below, none of plaintiffs' evidence at trial
on the issue of an HMO market spoke to the critical issue of
"interchangeability." Plaintiffs were reduced to arguing on appeal that HMOs and other health plans were simultaneously
good substitutes in the health care financing market and not
good substitutes in an HMO "submarket"-a position unanimously rejected by the courts and commentators as a fundamenof the United States Supreme Court's decision in
tal misreading
16
Brown Shoe.
I dwell on the specific state of the record because one cannot
assess the significance of Judge Posner's opinion without appreciating how dramatically deficient the record in this case actually
is. Nor can one understand-without complete stupefactionhow such fundamental holes in this record could exist without
appreciating the nature and origin of this dispute. This complaint was filed as a means to force the Clinic to give Blue Cross
a managed care contract on the terms Blue Cross wanted rather
than the terms the Clinic was offering. 17 Indeed, Blue Cross's
Chief Executive Officer confided to the head of St. Joseph's
Hospital that he intended by this litigation to "own the Marshfield Clinic." 18 Assuming that this particular nun was not prepared to lie, the CEO's statement may explain why Blue Cross
did not confine itself to a claim that Marshfield was "essential"
for any HMO and therefore must do business with Blue Cross.
15. See infra part II.
16. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See infra part II.
17. For a description of these negotiations, see Kevin D. McDonald, Blue Cross v.
Marshfield: If Antitrust Law Is a Tuxedo, This Case Is a Brown Shoe, 9 ANTITRUST
HEALTH CARE CHRON.,

18.

No. 3, at 2, 10 (1995) [hereinafter McDonald].

Record at 261, Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (No. 94-C-137-
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Instead, it claimed that nearly every business decision of the
Clinic for the last two decades was illegal: every decision to
open each of the twenty-one satellite clinics in underserved portions of rural Wisconsin; every decision to enter into each of the
hundreds of agreements by which independent doctors affiliated
with Marshfield's HMO; and every decision to enter into each of
the dozens of other agreements with hospitals, clinics, doctors,
and other health insurers. According to Blue Cross, this concatenation of conduct and agreements in more than thirty "monopolized" markets violated the law under nine separate antitrust
theories, to wit, monopolization, attempted monopolization,
conspiracy to monopolize, conspiracy in restraint of trade, price
fixing, conspiracy to allocate customers, conspiracy to allocate
territories, conspiracy to allocate products, and unlawful tying
(yes, tying). 19
As the saying goes, when you have said everything, you have
said nothing. A plaintiff taking such an unfocused approach
runs the risk that what may prove to be the controlling issue (or
issues) will be overlooked. Thus, even if one persuades a jury to
vent its ill will toward physicians as a group, one may later find
oneself, as Blue Cross did here, arguing that Marshfield "controlled" all the doctors in northern Wisconsin but unable to tell
the appellate court how many non-Marshfield doctors there are
in any given area-something Judge Posner found remarkable.2 °
One may also find oneself arguing to the Supreme Court that
this is a cert-worthy case because of the express MFNs in Marshfield's contracts with
its HMO affiliates when (gulp) such provi21
exist.
not
do
sions
Adopting the ProperPosner
The body of this article will analyze the opinion produced by
Judge Posner, with emphasis on the issues Blue Cross has
deemed worth of certiorari: (1) the existence of a separate
HMO market, and (2) the legality of the supposed MFNs. A
19. The plaintiffs recoiled viciously whenever asked to connect any such claim to a
specific market, to a specific reduction in competition, or to a specific injury to Blue
Cross. That, they retorted during the briefing on post-trial motions, was the jury's
job, not theirs. Plaintiffs' Opposition and Brief in Response to Defendants' Renewed
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for a New Trial at 113 (No. 94C-137-S). Judging by their certiorari petition, they next believed it was Judge Posner's
job. Cert. Petition at 11, Marshfield, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996) (No. 95-1118).
20. 65 F.3d at 1409.
21. See infra part Ill.
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close reading of the opinion, however, shows that the result of
those two issues turns not on any novel conclusion of law but on
the sufficiency of the evidence. As a sufficiency case, moreover,
it is an easy one.
That having been said, however, Judge Posner is someone
who cannot order tea without generating debate among antitrust lawyers. His customary wit and irreverence are fully on
display in the Marshfield decision. Indeed, Judge Posner's candor and (as he terms it) "impure" writing style 22 have caused
many-including Blue Cross here-to equate these personality
traits with judicial activism.23 But that will not wash. On the
central issues in Marshfield, Judge Posner continually reminds us
that the result must turn on the record evidence 24 and binding
precedent.
A close reading of the opinion also reveals that the only significant issues mishandled by the court were decided in Blue
Cross's favor. In a conclusion that truly is unprecedented, Judge
Posner rejected our argument that Blue Cross had no standing
as an indemnity insurer to sue Marshfield for the allegedly
"supracompetitive" prices charged to Blue Cross's insureds. We
pointed out that the Clinic's contractual relationship was directly with the insured and did not include Blue Cross, and that
the United States Supreme Court limits standing in overcharge
cases to the direct purchaser. Judge Posner hurdled that argument by simply assuming the existence of a contract between
Blue Cross and Marshfield-an assumption that is expressly
contrary to the record and to the only case law presented to the
court. That conclusion also has the potential for enormous practical consequences, none of which was discussed by our most
famous judicial pragmatist. 26 Finally, Judge Posner failed to notice the full consequences of his quite proper conclusion that
Blue Cross's attempt to equate "above average" prices with
"supracompetitive" prices was nonsense. But Blue Cross's failure to compare Marshfield's prices with those of comparable
22.

Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI.
1421, 1430 (1995).
23. Cert. Petition at 21, Marshfield (No. 95-1118).
24. 65 F.3d at 1409 ("[I1f there is a reasonable basis for this finding [of a separate
HMO market] in the evidence, we are bound to accept it regardless of what we might
think as an original matter.").
25. Id. at 1413 ("We are not authorized to abrogate doctrines that have been endorsed and not yet rejected by the Supreme Court ... .
26. See infra part IV.
L.

REV.
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providers of similar quality not only precludes a finding of
"supracompetitive" prices, it removes any basis for a finding of
antitrust injury.27
Of Winners and Losers
As a result of these omitted brush strokes, a sliver of Blue
Cross's claim remains. The jury's finding that Marshfield's
HMO had entered into a market division agreement with another HMO could survive, Judge Posner said, due to internal
Marshfield documents indicating that the two HMOs had
agreed "not to open offices in each other's territories. "28 Noting
the lack of proof as to what portion of the $600,000 in "overcharge" damages awarded to Blue Cross could be attributable to
this particular market division agreement, the court remanded
the case for a new trial on damages as to that single claim.
Based upon this holding, Blue Cross actually declared Judge
Posner's opinion a victory, or so their trial counsel announced to
the Milwaukee papers: "This means that we have won. "29
Well, let's think about that. Blue Cross's damages award,
once as much as $48 million, was vacated. Compcare, to whom
ninety percent of the damages had been awarded, was removed
from the case entirely. The award of attorney fees and costs was
vacated. The "sweeping injunction, ' 30 which at one time compelled the Clinic to deal with Blue Cross on "nondiscriminatory" terms and to stop charging "supracompetitive" prices, was
vacated. Even the costs of the appeal were awarded to
Marshfield.
As for the remand, Blue Cross has gone from nine theories,
thirty markets, dozens of predatory acts, and literally hundreds
of challenged agreements to one theory, one market, and one
agreement. To establish damages, Blue Cross must prove that a
market division agreement between two HMOs in a never-identified geographic area caused the price of services rendered to
Blue Cross indemnity patients to rise above competitive levels.
Blue Cross must do so, moreover, having already taken the position that each of the other agreements and predatory acts challenged-all since found to be legal-had caused the same price
27.
28.
29.
dict in
30.

See infra part V.
65 F.3d at 1416.
Geeta Sharma-Jensen, Ruled a Natural Monopoly: Appeals Court Softens VerMarshfield Clinic Case, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 1995, at D1.
65 F.3d at 1408.
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rise. Connecting its damages to a specific claim is precisely what
Marshfield maintained Blue Cross could never do and what

Blue Cross argued it was not required to do. If damages are
shown, moreover, any resulting injunction must be limited to
forbidding future market division agreements. 31 Critically,

Marshfield cannot be enjoined to "deal" with Blue Cross.32
Thus, Blue Cross's hope of forcing its contract terms on Marshfield through litigation rather than hard bargaining-always the
driving force of this dispute-has been dashed.
As with any debate over winners and losers, the key lies in
defining the terms. I do not know what victory means to Blue
Cross, but if Judge Posner's opinion feels like a win, losing must
involve a human sacrifice.
II.

THE

HMO

MARKET AND THE MARSHFIELD RECORD:

"My KINGDOM FOR AN ECONOMIST!"

At the conclusion of post-trial motions, the damages award to
Blue Cross and its HMO, Compcare, was almost exactly $17 million after trebling. More than $15.2 million, however, represented lost profits to Compcare for being "excluded" from the
HMO market by virtue of Marshfield's refusal to accept its contract terms. 33 If the market is overall health care financing, however, Compcare has not been excluded from anything because
all other sellers in that market (most notably, Blue Cross's indemnity plan) compete vigorously without such a contract.
Thus, as even the district judge agreed,34 Compcare's award is
necessarily gone unless there is a separate HMO market.35
Blue Cross contends that the court's rejection of its HMO
market was not based on the sufficiency of the evidence but on
31. 65 F.3d at 1416.
32. Id.
33. Cert. Petition at 7, Marshfield, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996) (No. 95-1118).
34. Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
35. No plaintiff to date has succeeded in claiming that HMOs comprise a product
market distinct from other forms of health insurance. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 598-99 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming fact finder's rejection of HMO market); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d
1325, 1331 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming rejection of alleged "HMO services" market);
National Benefit Adm'rs, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 1989-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH)
68,831, at 62,372 (M.D. Ala. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1143 (11th Cir.
1990); Hassan v. Independent Practice Assocs., P.C., 698 F. Supp. 679, 695 n.47 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) (granting summary judgment). See also Ocean State Physicians Health
Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 692 F. Supp. 52, 68 (D.R.I. 1988) (market is a "means to finance health care"), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
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exotic economic theories imposed by Judge Posner as a matter
of law.36 If he was unclear on this point, it was not for lack of
trying: "Compcare persuaded the jury that HMOs constitute a
separate market ...

and if there is a reasonable basis for this

finding in the evidence, we are bound to accept it regardless of
what we might think as an original matter. '37 Nor did Judge
Posner break new ground in stating the standard for product
market definition: "In defining a market, one must consider substitution both by buyers and by sellers. ' 38 For this Judge Posner
cites Professor Areeda, hardly a "Chicago school radical" of the
type Blue Cross attempted to demonize in its petition for certiorari.39 Substitution by buyers goes by several polysyllabic
names, such as demand substitutability, interchangeability, and
(price) cross-elasticity of demand; the essential inquiry is
whether a consumer is so likely to switch to product B if the
price of product A rises that a monopoly of product A would be
fruitless. Far from novel, the cases establish that no product
market finding can be sustained without proof that the market
includes all products deemed "reasonably interchangeable by
consumers. '"40

Even Brown Shoe, the 1962 United States

Supreme Court case on which plaintiffs principally relied, makes
the same point: "[T]he boundaries of the relevant market must
be drawn with sufficient breadth to include.., competing products . .

.41

Plaintiffs have argued that Brown Shoe lists several "factors"
relevant to product market analysis, such as different product

features, and that these factors can produce a "submarket" for
product A standing alone, even if consumers regard product B
as a good substitute. I am aware of only one district court that
has accepted this view, and that decision was promptly reversed
by the Sixth Circuit in White & White, Inc. v. American Hospital
Supply Corp.42 It is now accepted among circuit courts that the
"practical indicia" of submarkets discussed in Brown Shoe are

simply "evidentiary proxies for direct proof of substitutSee, e.g., Cert. Petition at 10-11, Marshfield (No. 95-1118).
65 F.3d at 1409.
38. Id. at 1410 (citing IIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN
530a (1995)).
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
39. Cert. Petition at 21-22 n.19, Marshfield (No. 95-1118).
40. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-95 (1956).
41. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962) (emphasis added).
42. 723 F.2d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 1983).
36.
37.

Published by LAW eCommons, 1996

11

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 5 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 5

ability. '4 3 I know of no contrary view, and none was presented
to the Seventh Circuit by Blue Cross.
Given this state of the law, the trial record on substitution by
buyers is particularly dismal for Blue Cross. No consumer of
HMO services-no enrolled employee, no sponsoring employer-testified at trial. No data on consumer views or reaction to price changes was presented by plaintiffs." The only
such data in the record came from Marshfield's expert, who described his interviews of large employers considering HMOs, all
of whom acknowledged the interchangeability of competing
plans.45
The expert economist for plaintiffs, moreover, directly contradicted the existence of a separate HMO market. First, he acknowledged that he had been retained to consider all of the
markets affected by the alleged conduct of Marshfield and its
HMO; he had not been limited or told to ignore any markets;
and he was aware of the complaint's allegation that the defendants had monopolized the "HMO services" market.46 Nonetheless, he had not concluded that there was a separate HMO
market. Well, then, from what market had Compcare been excluded? Why, from the "health care financing" market, he responded, which includes HMOs and other health insurance
plans.47 This was devastating since, as the cases above hold,
once two products are deemed interchangeable in "a broad market, there are no 'economically significant' submarkets. 48
As if this record were not bad enough for plaintiffs, there
were also dozens of admissions in the Blue Cross documents (as
you might imagine) that HMOs and other health plans directly
compete. While it is difficult to choose, my favorite is in the
1993 Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Under the heading "Competition," it stated: "The
43. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987). Accord, e.g., H.J., Inc. v. ITT Corp., 867
F.2d 1531, 1540 (8th Cir. 1989).
44. In their certiorari petition, plaintiffs claim that the district court upheld the
verdict on the separate HMO market by making "specific reference to ... consumer
preferences .... " Cert. Petition at 11, Marshfield, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996) (No. 951118). No such reference can be found, either on the page plaintiffs cite or elsewhere
in the opinion. See Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
45. Record at 2061-62, Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (No. 94-C-

137-S).
46. Id. at 779-82.
47.
48.

Id. at 788-89.
II PHILLIP E. AREEDA &

DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS I 535b at 419-21 (1978).
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health care insurance industry is highly competitive.... Compcare and Valley49 face substantial competition from other
HMOs, PPOs, self-funded plans, the Parent [Blue Cross] and
indemnity insurance carriers." 50 Another document identified
Marshfield's HMO as one of the top three competitors of Blue
Cross's indemnity plan.5 We compiled no fewer than twelve
such statements in a demonstrative exhibit.52 No documents
were discovered that even qualified much less contradicted this
point.
This is not to say that plaintiffs ignored the issue entirely. After the economist testified, plaintiffs called their own HMO
president, who was qualified as an "expert" on HMOs, and he
opined that HMOs are a separate market from other plans. Our
objection to his testifying as an expert was overruled even
though he conceded that he had no background in economics,
that this was the first time he had ever been asked to define a
market, and that he had no expertise concerning other health
plans (such as PPOs), even though he was about to testify that
these plans were not in the same market as HMOs. 3 The cross-.
examination revealed that his opinion was based on the following: (a) HMO plans had different features than indemnity insurance and PPO plans, such as gatekeepers; and (b) even though
many consumers did switch between HMOs and other plans (acknowledging that in the Marshfield area, consumers had
switched from HMOs to indemnity plans, but he did not know
to what extent), in his "experience" many consumers are quite
loyal to HMOs. The latter point led to this telling exchange:
Q: And there's [sic] some people who love Buicks. Is that
right?
A: There's [sic] some people who like Buicks, yeah ..
Q: Is there a separate automobile market for Buicks? Does
that make any sense?
A: Yeah.54
Blue Cross made no mention of its HMO president's testimony in either its Seventh Circuit brief or its petition for certio49. Referring to another Blue Cross HMO, Valley Health Plan. See infra note 62
and accompanying text.
50. Exhibit 236 at 18, Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (No. 94-C137-S).
51. Exhibit 884, Marshfield (No. 94-C-137-S).
52. Id.
53. See Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Jeffrey J. Nohl, Marshfield (No. 94-C-137-S).
54. Record at 1147, Marshfield (No. 94-C-137-S).
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rarin-a wise choice in my view. But this evidence fails to
support the jury's finding not just because it is so feeble, or even
because contrary evidence from Blue Cross's fact witnesses,
economist, and sworn statements to the SEC overwhelmingly
refutes it. The HMO president's testimony is insufficient because it critically fails to address the controlling issue of interchangeability. An antitrust chestnut is that the existence of
different product features-the very essence of product differentiation-is meaningless if consumers view the products as
substitutes for the same end use. (A case about glass and metal
containers comes to mind.5 5 ) The well-prepared testimony of
one of Blue Cross's employees demonstrates how plaintiffs simply do not get the point of interchangeability:
Q: Do [Blue Cross indemnity] products compete with Security
Health Plan?
A: We compete for the same prospects. But no, I don't believe that we compete with
the same product because I56
they're different products.
As for product loyalty by "some" consumers, Judge Posner
himself previously pointed out that because sellers do not know
which consumers are especially loyal or especially in need of a
particular product feature, they must aim for the marginal consumer who reacts to changes in price and quality. 7 Anyone
who thinks that Buicks are a separate automobile market need
only58look at the cases collected in Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor
Co. to find that the argument has been repeatedly rejected
through the years-ever since the car in question was a Packard.
In its certiorari petition, Blue Cross abandoned all pretense
that its evidence addresses the actual substitution of health plans
by consumers. It relies entirely on the "practical indicia" of sub55. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449 (1964).
56. Record at 631, Marshfield (No. 94-C-137-S) (emphasis added). In their appellate brief, plaintiffs asserted that they had presented "customer surveys," Appellees'
Brief and Supplemental Appendix at 26, Marshfield, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Nos. 95-1965, 95-2140), but nothing they cited even addresses substitution between
health plans. Blue Cross tacitly conceded the point by citing such surveys only for the
proposition that HMOs are "distinct from other forms of health care financing." Id.
As shown, however, distinct product features are not enough to establish a separate
market if the "distinct" products are freely substituted. Blue Cross did not cite this
"evidence" in its petition for certiorari.
57. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1284 (7th Cir.)
("diet soft drinks sold to diabetics are not a relevant product market"), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 920 (1990).
58. 952 F.2d 715, 723-24 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting jury finding that Ford tractors
are a separate product market), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 (1992).
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markets under Brown Shoe and points to only two indicia: (1) A
Marshfield employee "admitted" in an internal document that
its HMO "could charge monopoly prices as long as it was the
only HMO operating in the region";5 9 and (2) HMOs, unlike
other plans, are subject to government regulations that require
"certain employers to offer their employees a separate HMO
60
option."
The first point is flatly inaccurate and, in any event, circular.
It is not surprising that no Marshfield document admitted to
"monopoly" pricing; what may be surprising is that at least ten
other HMOs operate in "the region" allegedly monopolized by
Marshfield-including Valley Health Plan, Blue Cross's joint
venture with the Mayo Clinic.61 (Marshfield's supposed monopoly "power" was somehow unable to deter the entry of that joint
venture.) Furthermore, the point is circular: this internal statement only raises the question of whether the Marshfield employee was correct in asserting that Marshfield could charge
monopoly prices, a question that can only be answered by an
examination of objective, market-based evidence that is entirely
missing from this record.
The government regulation cited as the second of the "practical indicia" actually refutes plaintiffs' argument. Even plaintiffs
describe the governmental regulations on which they rely as
"preclud[ing] other types of health plans from substituting for
HMOs. '' 62 If these other health plans were not already substitutes for HIIOs, there would be no need to preclude them from
substituting. Assume that Wisconsin passed a law requiring any
employer providing company cars to offer sport utility vehicles
as an "option." Would that indicate that sport utility vehicles
are not considered good substitutes for other cars? Just the opposite, it seems to me. Regulations that insist that HMOs be
included on the list of options only indicate that HMOs have a
better lobby than other plans, not that they do not compete.
These desperate arguments underscore the woeful state of the
record for plaintiffs, not only because the arguments do not
work, but because they are the best that plaintiffs can offer.
These "indicia" are the extent of the evidence that plaintiffs can
59.
60.
61.

Cert. Petition at 15, Marshfield, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996) (No. 95-1118).
Id. at 16.
Record at 2126-28 & Exhibit 957, Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Wis.

1995) (No. 94-C-137-S).
62.

Cert. Petition at 16, Marshfield (No. 95-1118).
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cull from this record to support the verdict. If the day should
come when a separate HMO market is proven, a possibility left
open by Judge Posner, the record will contrast sharply with the
plaintiffs' diffident effort in Marshfield. The economic expert
will support, rather than contradict, the conclusion; the party
will present and the jury analyze genuine data on actual consumer substitution; and the party will not simultaneously claim
that HMOs are good substitutes in a "market" but bad substitutes in a "submarket." Nor is this too much to ask. When
looking at the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard is merely
reasonableness: "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must
be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff. ' 63 Under this or any other standard, Judge Posner's
conclusion that the "record shows" that the buyers of health insurance "regard HMOs as competitive not only with each other
but also with the various types of fee-for-service provider, including [PPOs]." 64 cannot seriously be disputed. Which only
brings us to the second requirement of product market definition, substitution by sellers, sometimes called cross-elasticity of
supply. If the maker of product C can easily convert its facilities
to produce product A, then a monopoly of product A is still
fruitless. (As soon as the price of product A is set too high, the
makers of product C will enter the market and drive the price
back down.) The plaintiffs did not address this proof requirement at all. Their economist had chosen the health care financing market, and no other witness addressed supply substitution.
Otherwise, the record reflected that Blue Cross had pervasive
PPO networks in northern and central Wisconsin, using many of
the same doctors affiliated with Marshfield's HMO.65 (Blue
Cross never tried to explain why independent doctors would
join their PPO but not their HMO.) Moreover, when asked by a
client to do so, Blue Cross established a "great" network for a
point-of-service plan in the counties immediately surrounding
Marshfield in only ninety days, 66 a network admittedly indistinguishable from an HMO network.67
These facts, in our view, made it impossible for the record to
support a conclusion under plaintiffs' "essential facilities" claim
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (emphasis added).
Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1410.
See, e.g., Exhibit 862, Marshfield (No. 94-C-137-S).
Record at 332-33, 344 & 709, Marshfield (No. 94-C-137-S).
Id. at 1123-25.
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that Blue Cross could not set up a competing HMO in northern
Wisconsin without the Clinic's doctors. As Judge Posner's opinion demonstrates, moreover, these facts also render futile, at
least without evidence specifically addressing the question of
supply substitution, the argument that other network-based
health care plans can be excluded from the definition of an
"HMO market."
III.

MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSES: "IT'S ACADEMIC"

While the trial record presented to the United States Supreme
Court on the question of the HMO market could not be much
worse, I must make one concession: at least the record reflects
the existence of one or more HMOs. The same cannot be said of
the other presented question, which purports to be based on the
existence of express "most favored nation" clauses in Marshfield's affiliated provider agreements. Blue Cross's petition for
certiorari describes the issue this way:
Security [Health Plan] agreements provide that affiliated physicians will be compensated for services provided to Security
subscribers at their usual fee rates-so long as the affiliated
physicians further agree to a "most favored nation" ("MFN")
clause preventing them from receiving less from any other patient or health plan.6"
Elsewhere, Blue Cross repeatedly attacks the "use of MFN
clauses within those agreements"69 and the "explicitly exclusive
agreements with other local physicians to keep out potential
competitors. ' 70 One can almost hear a voice ring out at Mission
Control: "Houston, we have a problem. We have checked the
record in the Marshfield case and there are no MFN clauses.
Please advise."
The Supreme Court could not have been happy about this. I
consider it a genuine first to ask the Supreme Court to consider
a case involving MFN clauses when the record fails to reveal any
MFN clause. In truth, Judge Posner did make reference to
MFNs and noted that such clauses are "not price-fixing,"'" but
he also described an HMO's economic incentive in blunt terms:
"if you get very sick . . . [it is] to let you die as quickly and
68.
69.
70.
71.

Cert. Petition at 4, Marshfield, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996) (No. 95-1118).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 9.
65 F.3d at 1415.
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cheaply as possible. '72 (Ah, Posner!) No one represented to the
Supreme Court that that is true.
How did Blue Cross inject this "MFN" discussion, then? One
must follow the progression of the plaintiffs' argument that the
agreement between Marshfield's HMO and its independent affiliates, without more, constitutes per se price fixing. At trial,
this argument was in its most pristine form: Marshfield's HMO,
which is owned by doctors, agreed with other doctors on the
prices the HMO would pay to those other doctors for services
rendered to HMO patients. With this agreement, they "fixed"
the price. Get it? 73 On appeal, plaintiffs were understandably
uncomfortable with the sophistication of the argument that an
HMO purchasing physician services "fixes" a price every time it
agrees on how much it is willing to pay for those services-an
argument that has been expressly rejected by the First Circuit. 74
Thus, in the section of their appellate brief entitled "Price Fixing," plaintiffs described the HMO affiliate agreements as
follows:
The "Affiliated Provider Subcontract" enables Marshfield to
review and approve the physicians' fee schedules annually.
This is not, as Marshfield states, a "buyer and seller setting a
price." Affiliated physicians must submit to Marshfield a
schedule of their "usual and customary charges" and their
Marshfield payment is based on that schedule. Obviously,
Marshfield does not wish to pay the affiliates more than the
affiliates charge their non-enrollee patients, and the practical
result of the contracts is to establish a floor for all of an affiliate's charges, not just charges to Marshfield. Thus, the physician's fee schedule subject to Marshfield's approval is the only
one in effect for all of the physician's patients.75
In this passage, note that (1) Blue Cross does not suggest that
the "Affiliated Provider Subcontract" contains an MFN clause
(for good reason, as we shall see), and (2) Blue Cross does not
say that Marshfield pays 100% of any affiliate's usual and customary charge, only that "their Marshfield payment is based on
that schedule" (words carefully chosen, as we also shall see).
The facts contained in the first three sentences, moreover, de72. Id. at 1410.
73. I have described the price-fixing argument as it was made at trial in more
detail elsewhere. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 12-13.
74. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 594-95 (1st Cir.
1993).
75. Appellees' Brief and Supplemental Appendix at 15, Marshfield, 65 F.3d 1406
(7th Cir. 1995) (Nos. 95-1965, 95-2140) (citations to record omitted).
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scribe only a "buyer and seller setting a price." Only the fourth
sentence states that the "practical result" of the contract is to
"establish a floor" for all prices because the Clinic "[o]bviously"
does not wish to pay more than others. This grand conclusion
characteristically fails to find support from anything in the record. While words such as setting a "floor" under prices are antitrust code for the effect of MFNs, going from assuming a
"practical result" similar to that of MFN clauses based on no
record evidence to telling the Supreme Court that such clauses
are expressly found in the contract is quite a leap.
To the contrary, the specific subparagraph from the affiliate
agreement cited in Blue Cross's appellate brief provides as
follows:
3.01 ProfessionalFee. Subject to the limitations outlined below, Clinic agrees to reimburse the Affiliated Provider(s) at a
rate of eighty-five percent (85%) of the lesser of Provider's
usual and customary charges and Plan's maximum allowable
charge for covered care that is rendered to eligible Participants
in Plan except as outlined below in Plan's Prepaid Medicare
Program.76
Nothing in this clause requires the affiliate to charge any particular fee to anyone else. More to the point of an MFN, nothing stops the affiliate from giving a larger discount from its fees
to anyone else. It is not surprising, then, that every affiliate
asked testified that the HMO agreement with Marshfield had no
effect whatsoever on the prices charged to any other patient.77
Plaintiffs made no attempt to show the affiliates' other prices or
even their discounts to other health plans (including plaintiff's
very own Valley Health Plan). On this point, all the record
shows is the contradictory language of the contracts and the flat
denials of the affiliates.
The Marshfield provider agreements also put the lie to plaintiffs' assertion in the certiorari petition that HMO affiliates were
given "lucrative" contracts "at their usualfee rates. '78 As shown,
the agreement expressly provides for a discount of eighty-five
percent or even lower, depending on the HMO's maximum allowed price. The notion that Marshfield pays 100% of the affiliates' requested charges was a point uncritically accepted on
76. Exhibit 1444 at 3, Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (No. 94-C137-S).
77. Defendants-Appellants' Supplemental Appendix at 460, 463, 470, Marshfield
(Nos. 95-1965, 95-2140).
78. Cert. Petition at 4, Marshfield, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996) (No. 95-1118).
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post-trial motions by the district judge.7 9 If he had read more
carefully the three transcript pages cited by the plaintiffs in support of this position, he would have seen that the witness was
describing not the initial fee-setting provision, but the operation
of a withhold provision in the provider agreement. 80 After
Marshfield's HMO and the affiliate agree on the reimbursement
schedule, the HMO initially pays ninety percent of the agreedupon amount (the eighty-five percent amount) and withholds
the remaining ten percent. At year end, based on a series of
efficiency incentives, some or all of the ten percent is paid to the
affiliate. This witness simply observed that, in several consecutive years, the affiliate had received the full ten percent withheld, or 100% of what the HMO had previously agreed to pay. 1
No person familiar with an HMO or with this record could argue in good faith that this evidence somehow refutes the existence of the express discount in the provider agreements.
Back to Judge Posner. Considering plaintiffs' claim of price
fixing, he moved at breakneck speed to react to plaintiffs' reference to the "floors" under prices:
[T]he only evidence of collusion is that the Clinic, when buying
services from the affiliated physicians either directly or
through Security [Health Plan], would not pay them more than
what these physicians charge their other patients. This is said
to put a floor underneath these physicians' prices, since if they
cut prices to their other patients their reimbursement from the
Clinic will decline automatically. This is an ingenious but perverse argument. "Most favored nations" clauses are standard
devices by which buyers try to bargain for low prices, by getting the seller to agree to treat them as favorably as any of
their other customers. The Clinic did this to minimize the cost
of these physicians to it, and that is the sort of conduct that the
antitrust laws seek to encourage. It is not price-fixing.82
Make no mistake. This was the first time in this litigation that
the phrase "most favored nations" was used to describe these
agreements. (Ironically, the only occasion on which the term
was mentioned in the trial court was when Blue Cross requested
a provision in the injunction to require Marshfield to give Blue
79. Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. 1247, 1259 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
80. Record at 868-70, Marshfield (No. 94-C-137-S) ("Are you familiar with an
arrangement known as a withhold?").
81. Id.
82. 65 F.3d at 1415 (citations omitted).
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Cross an HMO provider contract that was to include an MFN
clause. The Judge declined.)
Judge Posner's MFN language understandably caused the
gnashing of teeth by lawyers at the Department of Justice, but
when they asked him to soften it, he did (by noting that there
was no evidence in this record of any anticompetitive consequences of any MFN). 83 The key statement in his single paragraph, however, is the observation that MFNs do not constitute
"price-fixing." No one, to my knowledge, has ever argued that
they do constitute price fixing-not even the DOJ. But that is
plaintiffs' only theory on MFNs here (remember, the "practical
result" argument appeared under the heading "Price Fixing" in
their brief). As we repeatedly pointed out below, Blue Cross
never tried to link any affiliate agreement to any one of the markets they defined nor tried to show the impact of any affiliate
agreement ("practical" or otherwise) on such a market. Thus,
there is no shot at this being a "rule of reason" case, even if the
record could be made to yield an MFN clause-and it cannot.
In this instance, Judge Posner's analysis has the effect of improving plaintiffs' argument factually but still rejecting it legally
on grounds that are unassailable. His discussion of MFNs is best
construed as an acknowledgment that the jury's finding of price
fixing cannot stand, even granting Blue Cross the full benefit of
its unsupported argument that the pricing provisions of the provider agreements "practically" act as MFN clauses-indeed,
even if there were express MFNs.

IV.

INDEMNITY INSURER STANDING: ASSUME A
CAN OPENER

On the question of standing, an HMO such as the plaintiff
Compcare is different from an indemnity insurer such as the
plaintiff Blue Cross. As a prepaid plan, an HMO contracts directly with providers like Marshfield for health care services and
then sells them as a package to its enrollees. If, as the result of
an antitrust violation, the price the HMO pays to a provider is
supracompetitive, the HMO would have standing to sue for
those overcharges. The patient/enrollee, however, would not
have standing, because its contractual relationship is with the
HMO only; the patient is not a "purchaser" with respect to the
provider.
83.

Id.
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With an indemnity plan, just the reverse is true. The patient
purchases services from any provider the patient chooses and is
reimbursed by the insurer for some or all of the charges. In that
case, it is the patient who has standing, not the insurer. That, in
any event, is the teaching of recent Supreme Court decisions
like Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters,84 and a raft of Seventh Circuit cases that
have limited antitrust standing, even more strictly than some
other Circuits, to consumers and competitors. 85 Because an indemnity insurer does not purchase services from the provider,
the indemnity insurer simply stands as a third party in a contractual relationship with the real purchaser-the patient-and is
precisely the type of party that lacks standing.
In torts, a leading treatise on damages set[s] forth the general
principle that, [w]here the plaintiff sustains injury from the defendant's conduct to a third person, it is too remote, if the
plaintiff sustains no other than a contract relation to such a
third person, or is under contract obligation on his account,
and the injury consists only in . . . increasing the plaintiff's
expense or labor of fulfilling such contract ......
A line of cases that Blue Cross cites as contrary actually relies
on this very distinction. As HMOs developed, litigants often argued that they were not "really" purchasers of medical services,
despite their express contracts with providers. Some even argued that doctors were ethically barred from "selling" to insurance companies, so the patients had to be considered the
"purchasers" for all purposes. These were weak arguments. In
one of the best-known cases, then Judge Breyer of the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected them, observing that insurers
were not limited to the option of reimbursement but, if they
chose, could purchase the services directly themselves: "[T]here
is no law forbidding a legitimate insurance company from itself
buying the goods or services needed to make its customer
whole. ' 87 When insurers choose to do so, they are purchasers
84. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
85. See, e.g., Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d
391 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1054 (1994); Southwest Suburban Bd.of
Realtors, Inc. v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 830 F.2d 1374, 1379 (7th Cir. 1987); In
re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig. (Bichan v. Chemetron Corp.), 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983).
86. Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 532 n.25 (alteration in original; citation omitted; emphasis deleted).
87. Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985) (emphasis added).
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for purposes of the antitrust laws, no matter what the rules of
medical ethics may provide. 88 However, there is nothing in this
language or these holdings to suggest that where an insurer does
not choose to act as a direct purchaser, it will still be considered
a "purchaser" along with the patient. It is crucial, therefore,
that the only court opinion in this line to turn on the question of
standing expressly notes that the direct purchase of services by a
prepaid Blue Shield plan had removed the patient as a purchaser, and, therefore, the insurance company was the only
party with standing to challenge the anticompetitive conduct of
the providers.89
Thus, we argued that while Compcare had standing to pursue
its essential facilities claim, Blue Cross had no standing as an
indemnity insurer to claim that Marshfield was guilty of monopolistically pricing services that Blue Cross does not buy. To support this argument on appeal, we had a record that was crisp and
clean: Blue Cross witnesses conceded that, as an indemnity insurer, they had no contract with the provider. 90 The HMO president himself noted that the direct provision of services by an
HMO means that it is "not just a financial mechanism as indemnity insurance is."91 Marshfield's agreements with its patients
expressly provide that the patient is responsible for the bill no
matter what kind of insurance is carried, and Blue Cross's agreements with its insureds expressly disclaim any obligation to the
provider.92
With that record, the only question is whether Blue Cross has
standing because, as a convenience to its insured, it sends a
check for its portion of the claim directly to the Clinic, and the
Clinic accepts it on the patient's behalf. Can that be enough?
When one's monthly car payment is deducted automatically
from the checking account, has the bank thereby "purchased"
an automobile? Think about it. The funds are not sitting at the
bank like an old bunk bed in a storage bin to which the owner
has the only key. They are invested, and the bank makes its
88.

Id. at 926.

89.

Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 815 F.2d 270, 276 (3rd

Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987) ("This injury-i.e., the payment of overcharges
... is unquestionably an injury suffered by Blue Shield alone. No one else can
possibly complain about it.").
90. Record at 108, 1129-30, Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (No.
94-C-137-S).
91. Id. at 1127.
92. Exhibit 385 at 57-58; exhibits 563 & 568, Marshfield (No. 94-C-137-S).
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living from the difference between what it earns on those investments and what it pays it customers in interest. The bank transfers the monthly car payment only because it is contractually
bound to the customer owner to do so. If the amount it transfers
is more than it should be, the bank is injured because it loses the
float on the amount it has "overpaid." So, if one happened to
buy a Buick (sorry, I cannot resist) and the monthly payment
therefor reflects a monopoly overcharge, does the bank have antitrust standing? (Put 10,000 of these cases together and there
would be a nifty suit against General Motors by Bank of
America.)
Not so under Associated General Contractors. Both the bank
in the example and Blue Cross here are parties in a "contract
relation" to the real customer, and the "injury consists only in
...increasing

.. . .-

[their] expense or labor of fulfilling such contract
Blue Cross's standing argument works only if Blue

Cross has become a party to the original contract by transferring
money owed by the patient to the Clinic. For that, we looked at
state contract cases; we found only one, but it was precisely apposite. In Erika, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama,94
the question presented was whether payments by Blue Cross directly to a provider on its insured's behalf creates a contract between Blue Cross and the provider. The answer was no; the
court found that Blue Cross was simply acting as the agent for
95
the patient in making the payment.

Judge Posner, to his credit, did not buy the argument that one
who transfers money on the client's behalf-as brokers, escrow
agents, or (gasp) lawyers commonly do-thereby becomes a
purchaser entitled to sue for any flaw in the underlying transaction. Instead, he found another way to establish standing:
The Supreme Court has been emphatic that only the direct
purchaser from an allegedly overcharging defendant has standing to maintain an antitrust suit.... But here the money went
directly from Blue Cross to the Clinic, and although the two
entities were not linked by any overarching contract, each payment and acceptance was a separate completed contract. We do
not think more is required to establish Blue Cross's right to
sue to collect these overcharges.96
93.
94.
95.
96.

Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 532 n.25.
496 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
Id. at 787-88.
Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1414 (emphasis added).
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This passage, more than any other, reflects Judge Posner's fa-

mous devotion to economic thought. For just as the stranded
economist in a rowboat with sealed tins of food thinks he can
avoid starvation by "assuming" a can opener, Judge Posner
avoids a legal hurdle by assuming a contract-created by the
simple transfer of money. As shown, however, this assumption
has support in neither the facts in the record nor the common
law.97

The potential practical consequences of this reasoning are
daunting. Now, anyone who pays a sum on a debtor's behalf has
standing to sue the creditor for breaches of the agreement creat-

ing the debt. No assignment is necessary; for an insurance company, no state law of subrogation, with all of its nuances
developed over more than a century, is required or relevant.
Judge Posner voiced concern about the practical problems in-

herent in the patient suing for amounts already reimbursed by
the insurer. But why is that concern so much more important in
an antitrust case than in a personal injury case or any other
where damages are routinely covered by insurance? There is no
pretense, moreover, that the patient may not also bring suit for
precisely the same wrong-yet it is to avoid such duplicative liti-

gation that the law of antitrust standing has grown so rigorous in
recent years.98

97. Those of you with encyclopedic knowledge of antitrust law may be wondering
how any discussion of standing in a health insurance context could proceed this far
without mentioning Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982), the case in
which a patient was permitted to challenge an insurance company's alleged effort to
keep certain providers (psychologists) out of the market. McCready, however,
neither helps Blue Cross nor resolves the standing issue here. The most obvious reason is that McCready made no claim for overcharges, and even Justice Brennan conceded that standing in an overcharge case is strictly limited to the direct purchaser.
Id. at 474. (Thus, Judge Posner did not rely on McCready.) Beyond that, the patient's
claim in McCready was that a concerted refusal to deal with her had reduced competition in a psychotherapy market in which she was a consumer. Id. at 475. These facts
have hindered attempts to read McCready broadly. Within a year of its issuance,
McCready was described by the Supreme Court as affirming standing for "the direct
victim of a boycott." Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 530 n.19. A Seventh
Circuit panel including two of the judges, Posner and Bauer, who heard the Marshfield appeal squarely held post-McCready that antitrust standing is limited "to those
who, as consumers or competitors, suffer immediate injuries ... ." In re Indus. Gas
Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 1982). Moreover, a subsequent decision
by the Ninth Circuit extending standing beyond consumers and competitors was accompanied by a searing dissent from then-Judge Anthony Kennedy, who explained
the limited holding of McCready and its relation to Associated Gen. Contractors. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1984).
98. Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 541-42.
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What is the nature of this "contract" that has been invented?
If Marshfield treats a Blue Cross patient who refuses to pay, can
Marshfield sue Blue Cross for its eighty percent? As you might
imagine, Blue Cross has never been subjected to (or heard of)
such a suit. Nor has Blue Cross ever intervened as a party in a
suit between Marshfield and a Blue Cross patient. If Marshfield
renders inadequate care to a patient, which care Judge Posner
now deems to have been partially "purchased" by Blue Cross
and resold to the insured, can the patient sue Blue Cross for
malpractice?
All of these issues deserve thorough treatment, which undoubtedly will be rendered in a future case. In the meantime,
Blue Cross has dodged a bullet that should have made this case
even easier than it is.
V.

ANTITRUST INJURY AND MONOPOLY OVERCHARGES:

NOT YOUR AVERAGE PRICES

An aspect of this case that has generated significant comment
that the Clinic's prices were
is the plaintiffs' argument
99

"supracompetitive." Before the appellate opinion, I had identified this issue as one of the three most worrisome for any integrated practice that strives for technological sophistication and

exceptional quality. 100 Some have interpreted Judge Posner's almost condescending rejection of plaintiffs' argument'0 1 as imposing a tougher standard than previously existed for proving

monopoly overcharges. 10 2
Understanding two points, I think, can assuage these worries.

First-and again-the record is a dismal failure for persuading
anyone that Marshfield's prices reflect anything other than its
concededly exceptional quality and facilities. The antitrust case
law provides established ways to adjust for quality and prove
monopoly prices, but these methods were eschewed by the
plaintiffs (because they produce the wrong result). Second, the
plaintiffs thought their proof of "high prices" could carry a very
high burden. Proof of "above average" prices without more,
they argued, could establish monopoly power, predatory con99. See, e.g., Melinda R. Hatton, Marshfield Wins! The Appeals Court Vindicates
Marshfield Clinic, GROUP PRAC. J., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 12, 13.
100. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 13.
101. Recall his statement quoted above: "Generally you must pay more for higher
quality." 65 F.3d at 1412.
102. James T. McKeown, 7th Circuit: HMO Isn't a Monopoly, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 22,
1996, at B7, Bll.
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duct, antitrust injury, and damages. It is one thing to prove a
monopoly and then show that the price level is what one expects: above competitive levels. It is quite another to say that a
"high" price level alone proves both the fact of monopoly and
the overcharge.
Taking the latter point first, Judge Posner addressed plaintiffs'
proof of price levels when considering the question of monopoly
power. The traditional indicator of monopoly power is a high
market share; anywhere south of fifty percent generally prevents
the inference of monopoly power based on share.1 °3 As discussed in the Introduction above, Judge Posner had already rejected the markets Blue Cross had defined. He went on to note
that, even in plausibly defined markets for physician services,
the plaintiffs had no chance of showing monopoly power
through market share because there was no basis for including
in Marshfield's share all sales by independent physicians who
happened to be affiliated with Marshfield's HMO. Without the
affiliates, Marshfield's share of even the badly defined markets
was insufficient.
That is where Judge Posner turned to prices. Plaintiffs had
argued that they did not need to show monopoly power through
market share because their evidence that the Clinic was able to
charge monopoly prices by itself could support the finding:
"Compcare also asked the jury to infer monopoly power directly
from the Clinic's high prices . . . . "104 You can see how quickly
this argument assumes its answer; one cannot very well charge a
"monopoly" price without monopoly power, so if we call the
prices "supracompetitive" (and the jury agrees), bingo: the essential element of monopoly power is established.
Think of how this works in a case where the accused monopolist has a low market share. Low market share speaks directly to
the central inquiry of market power: the ability of other sellers,
either in or out of the market currently, to respond to the defendant's high prices by increasing their own output. 10 5 Evidence of high market share can never answer the monopoly
question completely because it says nothing of the ability of new
entrants to supply the product.1°6 Low market share, on the
103.
104.

Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1411.
Id.

105.

Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1414 (7th Cir.

1989).
106. E.g., Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 671-72 & n.3
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986). See also Los Angeles Land Co. v.
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other hand, indicates that even those currently in the marketregardless of potential new entrants-can expand output if the
defendant charges a monopoly price.
If that is the state of the record, as it is here, it is extremely
difficult to show monopoly power from prices alone. Judge Posner did not expand the opinion to cover all of these preliminary
(and, to him, obvious) points, but the Seventh Circuit has discussed the issue in more detail elsewhere. In Valley Liquors,
Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd.,1°7 the court stressed that market
power "can rarely be measured directly" by consideration of
price or output and suggested that the evidence necessary to
support such an argument would "require[ ] sophisticated
econometric analysis. ' 10 8 This is as it should be; it requires compelling evidence to explain why the many competitors of the defendant currently in the market will watch the defendant reap
monopoly profits without responding.
Returning to the first point (what was the record?), Blue
Cross offered several of its own employees (one of whom was an
"expert" from Blue Cross's wholly owned consulting subsidiary)
to testify that Marshfield's charges were higher than the average
price for the same service charged by all Wisconsin providers.
Such evidence, of course, ignores quality, reputation, and overhead, not to mention investment in education, research, and
massively expensive equipment. But no Blue Cross witness
made any effort to adjust these prices for quality, or to compare
Marshfield with comparable providers. Marshfield's charges
were simply lumped with those of solo practitioners, poverty
clinics, and every other provider in Wisconsin. During the case
presented by the defense, we introduced the price comparisons
of providers found in the files of two other Wisconsin insurance
companies-Blue Cross's direct competitors. These comparisons had been prepared prior to this litigation and showed that
Marshfield's charges fell in the middle of the pack of mid- to
large-sized clinics in Wisconsin and Minnesota.10 9
Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d 1422, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1993) (a 100% share does not prove
market power unless the defendant could prevent new entry), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1307 (1994).
107. 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987).
108. Id. at 668 (citations omitted).
109. Record at 1578-79, 1602-03, 1606, Marshfield,883 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Wis.
1995) (No. 94-C-137-S). On one list of such clinics, Marshfield's charges ranked seventh out of ten; all of the clinics on the list exceeded the statewide "average," as you
would expect.
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On this record, it is hardly surprising, or momentous, that
Judge Posner concluded that a naked comparison with statewide
average prices says nothing useful to an antitrust court. This is
not a case where a defendant was shown to have ninety percent
of the market and to be charging prices thirty percent higher
than one could find in a comparable, less concentrated market.
Rather, the record showed only that a provider, with a low market share and quality alleged to be so exceptional that it was
"essential," charged prices that were above the average prices of
all other providers. If that is all one has, one is in trouble.
Nor is there anything newly burdensome in this for the plaintiffs. Antitrust treatises discuss several ways in which monopoly
"overcharges" can be established. One can use a "before or after" method or a "yardstick" method, by which prices in the monopolized market are compared with prices in a (real or
hypothetical) competitive market. Blue Cross was aware of
these methods, for its expert at the damages trial made a halfhearted attempt at using a "yardstick" method to quantify the
overcharges. (His analysis was remarkable for the fact that the
"yardstick" he chose as a "competitive" market was an area located inside the market Marshfield had supposedly monopolized.) Why Blue Cross elected to hold this evidence until the
damages trial is a mystery. In any event, when the jury made its
liability findings that Marshfield charged "supracompetitive"
prices and that Blue Cross had therefore suffered an antitrust
injury, it had before it only evidence that Marshfield's prices
were above the statewide "average."
Judge Posner, therefore, did not follow his analysis where it
leads. Blue Cross's only alleged injury was the payment of
overcharges (Compcare's injury was lost profits due to exclusion
from the HMO market). When that is the claim, comparison
with average prices is insufficient to establish even the fact of
injury. Under the Clayton Act, antitrust injury is an essential
element of every private antitrust claim and must be proven to
establish liability, not just to quantify damages. A supracompetitive price is one shown to be higher than the price the same
seller would charge in a comparable but competitive market.
Evidence that prices are higher than "average" with no adjustment for cost or quality cannot support a finding of antitrust
injury, especially when the average is taken from an area (here,
the state of Wisconsin) not even claimed to be a market, much
less a competitive one. After eliminating all of Compcare's
Published by LAW eCommons, 1996
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claims for lack of an HMO market, the court should have eliminated all of Blue Cross's claims for lack of an antitrust injury.
CONCLUSION

Imagine that you commissioned Marc Chagall to paint a mural, but he could only do so while being towed past the wall at
ten miles per hour. The result would be something like the
opinion Judge Posner produced in Marshfield: some portions
with the expected brilliance, others that could have been improved by a more deliberate touch, and still others that were
missed entirely. When one combines the boundless scope of
plaintiffs' theories, the shocking gaps in the record, and the frenetic pace of the analysis (the Judge returned from one brief
aside saying, "Forget all that . . .. "0), one is not surprised that
the opinion is occasionally hard to follow. Judge Posner does
not feel the need to unpack every argument, nor should he;
when an expert draws two circles, one entirely inside the other,
and then announces that they are separate geographic markets
for the same product, little needs to be said.
In the end, an antitrust plaintiff must live with the choices
made in litigating a claim. At trial, Blue Cross concentrated on
two issues, chosen for their jury appeal: (1) the Clinic charges
"high" prices, and (2) some Clinic doctors were mean to other
doctors, making the Clinic look like a bully. This obviously
played well to the jury. However, when the legal theory is that
the defendant has committed every antitrust violation known to
exist and some that are not (note the claim for "monopoly leveraging"), there is a grave risk that the record produced will support the essential elements of none. Analysis of the two issues
Blue Cross selected for certiorari vividly underscores the point.
The first issue-the HMO market-turns on a record lacking
the most basic evidence of market definition (economic opinion
and consumer substitution) and failing to address supply substitution entirely. The second issue-most favored nation
clauses-is a fabrication.
Before it was reversed, the outcome of the Marshfield case
was of vital importance to the growth of integrated health care,
especially in rural areas. Now, the Seventh Circuit's opinion is
important in the sense that any case rejecting specious and facile
antitrust arguments is important. It should deter other well110.

65 F.3d at 1415.
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heeled players in the health care industry from choosing baseless litigation as a shortcut to competitive success. For if others
are tempted to follow Blue Cross's path, they may at some point
seek the counsel of someone familiar with this case. I can see
the room and hear the question: "But even if we put this past a
jury, what happens on appeal?" Now I see the wise counselor
leaning back, eyes half-closed. Now I hear a sigh: "Ah .... "
Postscript: After this article was submitted for publication,
the Supreme Court of the United States issued an order on
March 18, 1996, denying Blue Cross's petition for a writ of certiorari. Although the Court adhered to its usual practice of stating no reason whatsoever for its denial of certiorari, the author
is persuaded that six or more of the Justices have subscribed to
each and every argument he has presented here. As of this writing, Blue Cross has not yet described the denial of its petition
for certiorari as a victory.
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